PrivAS: a tool to perform Privacy-Preserving Association Studies

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PrivAS is a tool to perform Genome-Wide Association studies (GWAS) using the Weighted-Sum Statistic (WSS) algorithm in a Privacy-Preserving environment. The underlying scenario takes into account three interacting parties: (1) a Client, e.g. a genomic research unit, wanting to measure the association between an observed phenotype and regions of the genome; (2) a Reference Panel Provider (RPP) possessing genetic data for a Reference Panel, e.g. a priori healthy individuals of a carefully selected ancestry and (3) a Third-Party Server (TPS) with large computational capacities. Our tool and its underlying implementation preserve both state-of-the-art performances and Privacy for all parties. Indeed, through a series of hashing and encryption mechanisms, we can assure that no genetic data from neither the Client nor the RPP are visible by the other parties involved. Furthermore, only the Client is able to view a decrypted version of the WSS results.



In our implementation of the secure WSS, three parties are involved:

1. the Client that possesses data for individuals presenting the studied phenotype
2. the Reference Panel Repository (RPP) that has data for unaffected individuals
3. the Third-Party Server (TPS) that will do the actual computation.

In order to allow these parties to work together without compromising the privacy of the data, encryption and hashing mechanisms will be implemented. The TPS will execute the WSS algorithm data where the variant its gene's name have been hashed, using the *SHA256* algorithm initialized with a key K_{hash} shared by the Client and the RPP but unknown to the TPS. As the Client doesn't have direct access to the TPS, its data will transit through the RPP server. Since the RPP knows K_{hash}, it is able to intercept the Client's data. So, these data are encrypted using the *AES* algorithm with a key K_{AES} generated by the Client. As the TPS needs to be able to decipher the Client's data, the Client sends K_{AES} to the TPS via the RPP, protecting the key from RPP by using an *RSA* encryption. The Client uses the public *RSA* key from the TPS K_p^{TPS} and encrypts K_{AES} with it. Later the TPS uses its secret *RSA* key K_s^{TPS} to decrypt the message. Once all computations are done, the TPS sends the results (that contain hashed gene names and their estimated p_{value}) to the Client via the RPP. The results are encrypted using the *AES* key K_{AES} from the Client. Finally, the Client decrypts the results and unhashes the gene names.

1. Client gets RSA K_p^{TPS} from TPS
2. Client gets the session's unique SHA256 hash key K_{hash} from RPP
3. Client and RPP use K_{hash} to hash variants and gene names, producing WSS_{Client} and WSS_{RPP}, Client builds hash dictionary
4. Client generates a unique AES key K_{AES}
5. Client uses K_{AES} to encrypt WSS_{Client} and sends $E^{K_{AES}}(WSS_{Client})$ to RPP
6. Client uses K_p^{TPS} to encrypt K_{AES} and sends $E^{K_p^{TPS}}(K_{AES})$ to RPP
7. RPP sends WSS_{RPP}, $E^{K_{AES}}(WSS_{Client})$ and $E^{K_p^{TPS}}(K_{AES})$ to TPS
8. TPS uses RSA K_s^{TPS} to retrieve K_{AES}
9. TPS uses K_{AES} to retrieve WSS_{Client}
10. TPS performs WSS association tests for each $hash^{K_{hash}}(gene)$
11. TPS produces a $hashed.result.table$, listing each $hash^{K_{hash}}(gene)$ to its WSS p_{value}
12. TPS uses K_{AES} to encrypt $hashed.result.table$ and sends $E^{K_{AES}}(hashed.result.table)$ to RPP
13. RPP sends $E^{K_{AES}}(hashed.result.table)$ to Client
14. Client uses K_{AES} to retrieve $hashed.result.table$
15. Client uses hash dictionary on each $hash^{K_{hash}}(gene)$ to get $result.table$







http://lysine.univ-brest.fr/privas

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This work was supported by the labex COMINLABS as part of the PrivGen project